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Microeconomic Issues in the 
Transition to a Market Economy 
Jan Svejnar 
S ince most disintegrating socialist economies have experienced rising 
inflation, the establishment of macroeconomic stability has been a natural 
IL focus of the intellectual and policy debate about their reform. However, 
evidence from developing countries suggests that a one-sided preoccupation 
with macroeconomic issues may be unfortunate, as macro stabilization pro- 
grams tend to unravel in the presence of an inadequate micro adjustment (for 
example, Kiguel and Liviatan, 1990). This finding is important because the 
socialist system introduced microeconomic distortions that probably transcend 
those observed in the third world. The recent developments in Poland, Yu- 
goslavia and the Soviet Union also support the hypothesis that macro stabiliza- 
tion will be difficult to achieve in the transforming socialist economies in the 
absence of adequate micro adjustments. 
In this paper I address what I consider to be the most important micro 
issues related to the transition from socialist to market economies. I first 
summarize the initial microeconomic conditions and then describe the main 
changes that have taken place in the early stages of the transition. Finally, I 
discuss the micro policy agenda that needs to be addressed if the transition is to 
be successful. 
The Initial Microeconomic Conditions for Transition 
The common initial conditions of the reforming socialist economies have 
been the limited extent of domestic markets and the isolation from the world 
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markets; centrally fixed absolute prices and distorted relative prices; incentives 
that are unrelated to economic efficiency; policy imperatives like the mainte- 
nance of full employment; a lack of well-defined property rights; an absence of 
institutions for accounting, antitrust, audits, or taxation; and a relative absence 
of market transactions. These common conditions have led to similar outcomes: 
misallocation of resources, obsolete infrastructure and capital equipment, low 
productivity and income levels, insolvency and slow adjustment of many state- 
owned enterprises, and severe ecological problems. Yugoslavia's initial condi- 
tions have been in many respects different (see Estrin in this issue), but the 
outcome has been qualitatively similar. On the positive side, these countries do 
possess a relatively solid and broad human capital base (Gelb and Gray, 1991). 
In addition, they have potentially significant access to foreign assistance. 
Input Markets: Labor, Capital, Energy 
Throughout the communist era, the supply side of the labor market 
functioned relatively well in the sense that households were generally able to 
make their own decisions, albeit in the context of significantly distorted wage 
and price signals (Gregory and Kohlhase, 1988). However, the limited housing 
market impaired labor mobility. The demand side of the labor market was 
distorted by labor hoarding and generally rigid behavior of traditional socialist 
enterprises. Labor hoarding resulted from both the prohibition of economic 
layoffs (only disciplinary layoffs were permitted) and the implicit incentives that 
the system gave to managers to keep excess capacity to meet production 
targets. 
The communist authorities also imposed a highly egalitarian distribution of 
earnings, with incomes of unskilled and semi-skilled workers frequently exceed- 
ing those of professional employees. Trade unions were political organizations 
whose primary task was to ensure that party policies were implemented at the 
level of enterprises (Windmuller, 1971). Unions did not engage in collective 
bargaining, although formally they did handle grievances and in the area ofjob 
security they at times sided with workers against the center (Granick, 1987). 
Strikes were explicitly or implicitly forbidden; disputes were handled by admin- 
istrative fiat or arbitration. 
Employees enjoyed virtually complete employment security. However, they 
were usually not assured of a specific job, but rather of employment within a 
specific firm or near their residence. The firms therefore did not have much 
flexibility to lay off workers, but they could induce significant intrafirm mobil- 
ity. The Soviet Union was an exception here, in that workers reportedly 
enjoyed job-specific employment security (Granick, 1987). Quit rates were 
around 10 to 20 percent and thus comparable to the rates observed in the 
United States and some western European countries (Riveros, 1990). In view of 
the many company-provided and thus non-vested benefits such as housing, 
child care and health, the relatively high quit rate reflected the ease with which 
workers could find alternative jobs and the fact that above-average wage 
increases could be obtained through a job change and reclassification. 
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The capital market has been characterized by underdeveloped financial 
institutions and a low volume of financial assets. There was no bond market 
and public sector deficits immediately translated into money creation. Interest 
rates on deposits were historically maintained at such low nominal levels that 
the real interest rate charged to firms was zero or negative. In most countries, 
the governments allocated investment funds centrally. Yugoslavia is an excep- 
tion here, as the allocation of capital has been significantly influenced by local 
authorities and the borrowing enterprises (Estrin, this issue; Prasnikar and 
Svejnar, 1991). Governments usually provided subsidies to loss-making firms 
and taxed away (that is, confiscated) profits of profit-making firms. The entry of 
firms was limited and exit of firms was virtually nonexistent. International 
capital flows were severely regulated. 
The allocation of most other inputs was historically also directed from the 
center, with prices often bearing little resemblance to the corresponding scarcity 
values. This led to very intensive use of some inputs, like energy, despite high 
world prices. The choice of investment projects was guided primarily by 
political considerations; only in the late 1980s did Yugoslav and to a lesser 
extent Hungarian and Polish banks start using the internal rate of return as an 
important criterion in project analysis. 
The Product Market, Industrial Organization, and Trade 
The socialist system generated an industrial structure that was highly 
concentrated with predominantly large state-owned enterprises. There were 
relatively few small- and medium-size firms. The system of incentives (linked to 
plan fulfillment) generated limited product variety and a rigid industrial 
production process. 
Tnhe product market has also suffered from price and quantity distortions. 
As the country papers in this volume indicate, with the exception of Hungary 
and Poland, price controls were until very recently virtually ubiquitous, making 
it difficult to identify inefficient firms. Hare and Hughes (1991) suggest that in 
some areas, like food production, the inefficiency of socialist enterprises has 
been so extreme as to yield negative value-added even in world prices.' 
The majority of foreign trade was historically carried out with other 
Soviet-bloc countries under a complicated system of bilateral trade (clearing) 
agreements based on nonconvertible currency. Trade with other countries was 
in convertible currencies. Virtually all trade was centralized, carried through 
state trading companies, and subject to quantitative restrictions.2 The pattern 
of trade was significantly influenced by political decisions. 
T Ihese results must be treated with caution, however, because the calculations rely on (fixed 
proportion) input-output data from industrial branches, rather than individual establishments. The 
corresponding differentials between world and domestic prices are obtained by comparing the 
international and domestic values of goods sold as reported by enterprises to ministries and 
statistical offices and aggregated by these latter institutions to the industrial branch level. Only 
goods that were traded on the western markets were thus included in this relative price calculation. 
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The Market for Land and Housing 
While most socialist countries permitted limited leasing and defacto owner- 
ship of land, a market for land was basically nonexistent. A real estate market 
has emerged in recent years, although most housing is still rented at controlled 
prices that are significantly below market equilibrium. Housing costs have 
constituted a relatively small fraction of consumer expenditures for most 
households, although a significant group of urban residents pay substantial 
rents for deregulated housing, in some countries through a black market. The 
maintenance of houses was generally poor, and considerable excess demand for 
housing existed at the subsidized rental prices. On the other hand, the system 
succeeded in avoiding blatant urban poverty. 
As for agricultural land, except for Poland, the socialist countries collec- 
tivized or nationalized most land. (More detail on agriculture is offered by 
Brooks, Guasch, Braverman, and Csaki in this issue.) Food shortages (at 
subsidized prices) were perennial and, as the fate of Gomulka and Gierek in 
Poland indicate, governments that increased food prices risked overthrow. 
Recent Microeconomic Developments 
The homogeneity of economic institutions and policies across socialist 
countries has diminished in recent years as countries have undertaken different 
reforms at different speeds. These changes are discussed in country-by-country 
detail elsewhere in this symposium. Here, I will summarize the main microeco- 
nomic reforms that have occurred. 
Conceptually, it is useful to classify the reforms into two categories: those 
aiming at reallocation of resources and those concerned with increasing the 
efficiency of resources, given their allocation. Contrary to popular belief, it is 
not clear that resources ought to be reallocated to a massive extent in the short 
run. For instance, it is not clear how many workers would be employed in the 
Hungarian steel industry under perfectly competitive conditions. Steel workers' 
productivity may be low, but productivity is low elsewhere as well. It may not 
have made sense to develop the steel industry to begin with, but in the short 
run the relevant issue is how to use labor optimally, given the existing capital 
structure. Note also that the profitability of a firm may not be indicative of its 
efficiency unless evaluated at shadow prices and wages (Svejnar and Terrell, 
1991). 
With respect to the efficiency of the use of resources, given their allocation, 
it is useful to distinguish reforms within the firm (like improved incentives) 
from institutional reforms which are beyond the capabilities of the firm and 
which require a role of the government (like the introduction of competition or 
a legal system). 
2Yugoslavia was again an exception. Its enterprises could trade directly, although in practice many 
firms relied on socially-owned trading firms to handle their export and import needs. 
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With the exception of the Soviet Union, the transforming socialist countries 
have liberalized most producer and retail prices. Prices of basic commodities 
such as bread, apartment rentals, and utilities have remained partially under 
control, as have prices of some industrial commodities. As part of the stabiliza- 
tion policies, most countries have also imposed restrictions on excessive growth 
of wages or wage bills of state enterprises (Hungary and Poland already in the 
1980s, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria and Romania in the 1990s). The price liberal- 
ization measures have encouraged efficiency of resource use and efficient 
reallocation of virtually all resources except for labor. As for labor, while the 
wage controls (penalties) impaired efficiency, the major fall in real wages that 
they induced in Poland and Yugoslavia in 1990 and Czechoslovakia in 1991 
slowed down the rise of unemployment. 
The monopoly of foreign trade organizations has been diminished or 
eliminated, and enterprises have been encouraged to seek export markets. 
Policies aimed at establishing a relatively low and diminishing protection and 
transforming nontariff barriers into tariffs have been either adopted or are in 
process. However, with the exception of Hungary and Poland, competition 
from imports has been coming slowly and many state enterprises have not 
undertaken major steps to enter new markets. 
All governments have adopted privatization programs for the state-owned 
(in Yugoslavia socially-owned) enterprises. While the schemes vary across coun- 
tries, they all distinguish the privatization of small firms from the privatization 
of large enterprises. The privatization of small firms is carried out primarily 
through auctions and, after initial difficulties, it has proceeded quite smoothly 
in Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland. In Poland, more than 20,000 outlets 
have already been sold and the majority of retail trade is in private hands. 
Hungary plans to finish transfering about 10,000 small-scale establishments to 
private hands in 1991 and Czechoslovakia hopes to auction about 100,000 
small businesses in 1991-92 (Gelb and Gray, 1991). This "small privatization" is 
observed to have positive effects on efficiency of resource use, but the impact on 
efficiency through reallocation of resources is at times intentionally limited; for 
example, in Czechoslovakia the privatized stores have to remain in the same 
line of business for at least two years. 
The privatization schemes for large companies rely on a combination of 
regulated spontaneous privatization (where enterprise management prepares 
and carries out a privatization plan, possibly with a foreign partner), sale of the 
property or shares to domestic or foreign buyers (emphasized in Hungary), 
distribution of some enterprise shares to employees (envisioned in most coun- 
tries), and distribution of shares (usually through vouchers or mutual fund 
shares) to the public at large (expected to be especially important in Czechoslo- 
vakia, Poland and Romania). The common problem has been the difficulty of 
privatizing many firms in a short time. As a result, most firms remain in state 
ownership and their commercialization has so far been more pro forma than 
real. Hungary, where the recently proclaimed five-year goal is to privatize 
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about 50 percent of medium- and large-size firms, appears to have gone the 
furthest by successfully privatizing about 10 percent of these firms by early 
1991 (see Hare and Wolf in this issue). 
Trade unions have re-emerged as institutions representing worker inter- 
ests, rather than government. They have engaged in industry-level bargaining, 
often within a tripartite government-labor-employer set-up. Notwithstanding 
the strikes in countries such as Poland, Romania and Yugoslavia, the unions 
have generally cooperated with (or at least tolerated) the transition policies. 
However, they could become formidable adversaries of the reform if the 
economic situation worsened. The tripartite set-up, while reflecting mainstream 
western European practice, has the important drawback that it limits the 
flexibility of individual enterprises to set incentives and can result in bankrupt- 
cies that might be avoidable if firms could set wages individually. 
Following the Yugoslav example, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland 
accorded workers participatory rights in management in the 1980s. With the 
disintegration of the communist regimes in the late 1980s, worker control of 
enterprises became significant in Hungary and Poland but it was greatly 
diminished in Czechoslovakia and somewhat diminished in Yugoslavia. As a 
result, a major policy issue revolves around the economic effects of strong 
insider power on enterprise performance in Hungary, Poland and Yugoslavia. 
Since the foreign trade patterns of the countries of Eastern Europe had 
been centered on the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance, they have 
experienced a major external shock as their historical trade relationships 
disintegrated. First, when East Germany reunited with the west in 1990, it 
broke off many trade agreements. Second, the desire of the Soviet Union to 
improve the quality of its imports means that lower quality goods from Central 
and Eastern Europe may have a difficult time finding any markets, despite the 
frantic attempts of the Central and East European governments to preserve 
barter and other deliveries to the Soviet Union. For example, 1991 Czechoslo- 
vak exports to the Soviet Union are expected to be 50 percent below their 1989 
level and the Soviets have demanded that two-thirds of these reduced exports 
be accompanied by export credits. 
The terms of trade also shifted against Eastern Europe when, on January 
1, 1991, much of the trade with the Soviet Union was switched from the 
clearing (barter) system to one based on hard currency payments. The collapse 
of the complicated CMEA system was inevitable. However, the speed of the 
disintegration and the lack of an alternative arrangement also reflects the 
instinctive, post-revolutionary desire in Eastern Europe to dismantle the old 
system without a careful consideration of the ultimate economic consequences. 
The reduction in government subsidies and the severe reduction in trade 
among these countries has forced many enterprises to discontinue nonviable 
production and reduce employment. Estimates of labor redundancy in state 
enterprises prior to the recent crisis commonly ran at 20 to 30 percent, but 
these estimates seem to be based on private rather than social (shadow price) 
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criteria. Recent labor force reductions have been considerably below the 20-30 
percent level, although as Wellisz indicates in this volume, by reducing employ- 
ment by 18 percent in the 1989-90 period, Poland's public sector has in fact 
carried out exceptionally sizable reductions. Schaffer (1991) reports that in 
1990, output in Poland's state enterprise sector declined abruptly by 25 percent 
while employment declined more gradually by 15 percent. Enterprises have 
hence displayed labor hoarding, which is consistent with both expected utility 
maximization by worker-insiders and with a socially optimal employment policy 
guided by the falling shadow wage in the economy. 
Since mass layoffs cannot account for the rapid rise in Poland's unemploy- 
ment from virtually zero in January 1990 to 7.1 percent in March 1991, 
Blanchard (1991) attributes it to individual layoffs, quits and the lack of hiring 
of new labor force entrants. My own research on Czechoslovakia suggests that, 
as the unemployment rate rose from virtually zero in mid-1990 to 3 percent in 
April 1991, it was first attributable primarily to a virtual hiring freeze, termina- 
tion of fixed term employees, and quits. However, as industrial production fell 
by 20 percent in the first quarter of 1991 and unemployment jumped from 1 
percent to 3 percent, layoffs became more significant. Overall, the early phases 
of the transition seem to have a strong negative impact on labor force entrants, 
while in the later stages the effect is broader. 
The firms are also experiencing considerable brain drain from the ranks of 
competent managers, technical personnel and skilled workers. Between their 
limited experience with labor markets and the severe wage or wage bill controls 
imposed upon them through the macro stabilization policies, they are not 
proving able to retain many of their top workers. To the extent that the 
enterprise capital stock has value, the depletion of important complementary 
inputs may result in substantial losses. I have not been able to find estimates of 
the extent to which the brain drain results in emigration or domestic private 
enterprise formation. 
All the countries have undertaken initial steps to introduce personal 
income taxes as well as a social safety net of unemployment, retraining, and 
social security benefits. The budgetary allocations for the safety net have so far 
been adequate, but they would not withstand a major increase in unemploy- 
ment. Retraining of workers has been relatively slow; government-sponsored 
retraining has been limited and enterprises have been slow to adjust to the 
changing environment. 
Most countries have attempted to establish capital markets by turning the 
traditional "monobank" system into one based on an autonomous central bank 
and a large number of competitive commercial banks. Up to now, at least, this 
effort has generally failed. The few newly created commercial banks are 
undercapitalized, they lack trained loan officers and other professionals, and 
their (inherited) assets are frequently in the form of loans to loss-making 
enterprises. They have been unable to provide even rudimentary financial 
services, such as timely check clearing and wire transfers, and frequently they 
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have been reluctant or logistically unable to provide credit for the creation of 
new firms or for the projects of already established private firms. Their loan 
activity has been oriented primarily towards their traditional state enterprise 
clients. As real interest rates have been raised in most of the transforming 
economies, the question has arisen as to whether enterprises have to pay the 
debt accumulated under the previous system. The issue is a serious one since, 
in the absence of a government write-off, either numerous enterprises or some 
banks are insolvent (Brainard, 1991). 
So far, western banks entering these economies have focussed primarily on 
joint ventures involving western firms. Their contribution to the financing of 
new local firms has been minimal. 
The decline in government subsidies, decrease in product demand and 
absence of a well-functioning banking system have led many enterprises to rely 
on inter-enterprise borrowing to reduce the shock and finance their economic 
activities. The practice, which is in principle similar to the problem of daylight 
overdraft in the U.S. financial markets, represents a serious threat to the entire 
transformation process. A widespread use of promissory notes usually culmi- 
nates in the insolvency of a large number of loss-making enterprises. Moreover, 
the expectation of massive bailouts by the government induces even efficient 
firms to enter the inter-enterprise credit system, thus eventually forcing the 
government to abandon its restrictive macro policies and intervene. The Polish 
and Yugoslav situations in the mid-to-late 1980s were examples of this phe- 
nomenon developing and getting out of hand, thus contributing to the subse- 
quent hyperinflations. 
Institutions conducive to market activities have been slow to develop, as 
well. All the countries of Eastern Europe have aimed at streamlining public 
administration while establishing new public institutions such as the tax, privati- 
zation and antitrust agencies. However, the process is hampered by numerous 
bureaucrats, state enterprise managers and others who perceive themselves as 
the likely losers if the process continues. There is also growing discontent with 
the emergence of the visibly rich individuals, often from the ranks of the 
former communist nomenklatura. All these factors hold back the process of 
transformation. 
Despite the twists and turns of policy and the factors holding back reform, 
many new firms have been established in some countries. Evidence from 
several countries indicates that small private enterprises develop rapidly once 
restrictions are lifted. Hungary has been liberalizing private sector activities 
since the early 1980s, with the result that it now has over 300,000 sole 
proprietors and several thousand private limited liability companies. Since the 
passage of Yugoslavia's Business Law in mid-1989, over 10,000 limited liability 
companies were created. In Poland, 980,000 sole proprietorships and over 
30,000 incorporated companies were registered by November 30, 1990 
(Dabrowski, 1991; Gelb and Gray, 1991). In Czechoslovakia, 15 months after a 
law was passed in April 1990, over 800,000 individuals registered for license as 
private entrepreneurs. 
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Overwhelming statistics like these do disguise the problems encountered 
by the emerging private sector. Private entrepreneurs are often hampered by 
rules and regulations, high taxes, corrupt public officials, and barriers to entry 
(such as the malfunctioning real estate market and advantages still enjoyed by 
the state enterprises). The single most important hindrance to the outburst of 
new private activity is probably the limited availability of credit, which stems 
partly from the undeveloped financial sector, the limited collateral of the 
starting entrepreneurs and the high real interest rate that is a by-product of the 
stabilization plans. Most private firms are therefore very small. Many are 
individual or family firms and some are simply the (previously clandestine) 
overtime activities of individuals. Many are shell companies established by state 
enterprise managers to enrich themselves by carrying out enterprise trade at 
inflated transfer prices. The previous size distribution of firms, which was 
unimodal and highly rightward skewed, has hence been replaced by a bimodal 
distribution, with relatively few midsized enterprises. The overall extent of 
private activities is still limited but growing, with Hungary, in addition to the 
self-employed, reportedly having 10 percent of its workforce employed in the 
private sector. In terms of GDP share, private sector activities at present 
probably exceed 20 percent in both Poland and Hungary (see also Wolf in this 
issue) and according to Milanovic (1990, Table 3) the proportion may be much 
higher. In terms of ownership of productive assets, the CIA (1991) estimates 
that the state still owns 80 percent in Hungary and Poland and over 95 percent 
in Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia. 
One of the most important findings of the transition period to date is that 
well-functioning markets, while rapidly appearing in some areas, do not auto- 
matically grow like weeds. Indeed, in many areas the successful introduction of 
well-functioning markets may be better likened to the nurturing of a green- 
house plant, rather than being a natural outcome of the liberalization of market 
activities. Retail markets in consumer goods (especially food and imports) 
emerged relatively fast in all countries after price liberalization, thanks to their 
relatively low capital and managerial requirements, but even here one observed 
important differences between the fast emergence of markets (including street 
vendors) in Poland and the slow process in Czechoslovakia. 
While it is too early to make definitive statements, areas where significant 
liberalization occurred without a quick and substantial (as opposed to thin) 
market response include export activities, foreign investment, financial mar- 
kets, real estate markets, and industrial production. While the aforementioned 
statistics on the rise in the number of private sector firms are impressive, 
observers have been surprised by the slow entry of potential western investors, 
the low penetration of imports in some countries and exports in most of them, 
the continued limited product diversity, the slow development of informal and 
formal financial markets, and the emergence of private firms only in special 
niches of industrial production. This limited development of markets in the 
face of seemingly thorough laissez-faire policies is notable, and deserves the 
serious attention of policy-makers. 
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The Microeconomic Policy Agenda 
The microeconomic reforms have so far been well-meant, but incomplete. 
When combined with fiscal and monetary restraint aimed at macroeconomic 
stabilization, the short-term outcome has been declining production in the 
formal (statistically recorded) sector,3 slow restructuring and reorientation of 
the large state enterprises, and only limited entry of sizable new firms. Of 
course, the hope is that the disappointing microeconomic developments are 
transitory. In this section, I discuss the main microeconomic policies that 
should be pursued to assist the realization of this aspiration. 
Functioning and Competitive Markets 
Perhaps the most important phenomenon that requires policy attention is 
the slow development of well-functioning markets in many areas. The problem 
appears to be brought about by several factors: the inability of governments to 
create a complete and consistent legal framework to guide economic activity; 
inadequate emphasis on the creation of competitive market institutions, infra- 
structure and supporting practices in the areas of financial services, real estate, 
domestic trade, transportation, and telecommunication; the slow creation of 
accounting, auditing and other information systems; and the lack of strong 
market-oriented managerial and worker incentives in state enterprises. In some 
instances, government institutions also continue to exert direct control and 
influence, rather than moving to indirect regulatory influence, thus stifling 
market activities. Finally, the experience of Hungary, Poland and Yugoslavia, 
which started introducing markets before others, suggests that many economic 
agents go through a learning period before successfully switching from the 
socialist to a market framework. Some of these factors deserve a few words of 
discussion. 
It is generally agreed that a clear and simple legal framework is essential 
for the functioning of a market economy (see Litwack's discussion in this issue). 
One notable aspect is that, while all the countries of Eastern Europe strive to 
join the European Community as soon as possible, none of them decided to 
adopt a (presumably consistent) legal framework from one of the western 
European countries or from the 1992 European Community framework. The 
result of the de novo creation of an entire legal system has resulted in an 
incomplete and at times inconsistent set of economic laws. 
The new Czechoslovakian tax system provides a good example: while the 
system introduced in 1990 strives to replace the turnover tax by a value-added 
tax, the tax system remains unfinished and the value-added tax is scheduled to 
be introduced only in 1992 or 1993. To add to the confusion, the profit tax is 
3World Bank estimates, reported by Gelb and Gray (1991), indicate that in 1990 real GDP declined 
by 10.2 percent in Bulgaria, 3.5 percent in Czechoslovakia, 6.5 percent in Hungary, 14.0 percent in 
Poland, 10.2 percent in Romania, and 3.2 percent in Yugoslavia. Some observers argue that the 
extent of economic decline is exaggerated as the newly emerging private activities are only partially 
recorded in official data. 
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applied very selectively as foreign firms (but not domestic producers) routinely 
obtain various degrees of tax relief. Finally, the Tax Office is still one of the 
least developed and hence ineffectual government agencies. The legal uncer- 
tainty, coupled with the risk of political changes, has had a negative effect on 
investment and entry of new firms, especially in areas where the sunk cost 
associated with entry is high. A key focus in most countries ought to be the 
establishment of a consistent commercial code as well as tax and bankruptcy 
laws. 
The success of the transformation hinges on a rapid expansion of the 
small- and medium-sized firm sector that can ensure output growth, generate 
new employment, provide a tax base, and generally augment the flexibility and 
dynamism of these economies. However, as noted earlier, neither domestic nor 
foreign banks seem willing to supply a sizable amount of capital to such firms. 
The financial sector continues to be regulated and underdeveloped in all the 
economies and the number of domestic and foreign banks with significant 
operations remains small. Domestic banks frequently continue to focus on their 
state enterprise clients, while the inflow of western financial capital has been 
both cautious and hampered by inability or unwillingness of government 
officials to negotiate or approve deals, the aforementioned uncertainty about 
the evolution of the legal and tax framework, and a number of seemingly trivial 
but actually serious problems, like the difficulties associated with finding office 
space. Perhaps most importantly, banks show a limited willingness to lend to 
new entrepreneurs with no reputation and limited collateral, which is of course 
understandable. In this situation, there is strong economic justification for 
government to step in and provide credit insurance or other measures to 
stimulate bank lending to this sector. The justification is all the more persuasive 
since the previous regime deprived enterpreneurs of assets and prevented 
them from establishing reputations. 
The slow development of the real estate market as well as the slow 
demonopolization of domestic trade and transport have limited the process of 
entry of new firms and demonopolization of other economic activities. Simi- 
larly, the lack of standard accounting and auditing procedures has slowed 
down the transformation process. It has also permitted corruption and illegal 
transfers of property, which may pose a longer-term threat to the perceived 
legitimacy of the reforms. 
In the labor market, the system of industrial relations has up to now not 
imposed major constraints. In the short term, the important distortion comes 
from the across-the-board restrictions on the growth of wages or wage bills 
imposed on the state-owned enterprises for macroeconomic stabilization. 
Clearly, strict control over state-owned enterprises with powerful worker insid- 
ers is needed to prevent indiscriminate wage increases and a run-down of the 
capital stock. However, it would be preferable to avoid distorting the labor 
market and instead to impose the hard budget constraint by permitting discre- 
tionary wage increases only if the enterprise operates without subsidies and 
pays the state a reasonable rate of return on its capital. 
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The Achilles heel of the transition and one of the reasons for the relatively 
slow emergence of new products and markets is the lack of a well-established 
system of property rights, accountability and well-designed incentives in state 
enterprises. The system of state ownership provides few incentives for the 
management to respond to market demand. While recent reductions in state 
subsidies have forced firms to respond more to market demand, the reaction 
has come primarily in the form of discontinuation of loss-making activities (like 
those associated with earlier exports to the Soviet Union); reorientation toward 
new production has so far been limited. As I discuss in a moment, this outcome 
is in large part brought about by the fact that managerial compensation still 
contains only limited incentives for the efficient operation of the firms. In 
addition, since there are thousands of state enterprises in each country, enter- 
prise supervisory boards are naturally composed of individuals that have little 
experience with enterprise operation in the market system. Moreover, the 
boards have been given only limited incentives and primarily advisory powers. 
As a result, state firms in all countries have been subject to only limited 
supervision. They have been permitted to engage in a variety of potentially 
dangerous activities, including the sizable accumulation of inter-enterprise 
credit and debt. 
A bona fide commercialization of state enterprises is clearly needed and 
large-scale privatization is the generally favored solution to the problem. 
However, as discussed earlier, privatization of the large state enterprises has 
proceeded very slowly. The widely shared disappointment with this outcome 
poses the danger that hastily designed large-scale privatization may result in 
massive failures and possibly require renationalization as was the case in Chile 
in the early 1980s (Luders, 1990). There is also the danger that privatization 
may create a situation where the population, faced with falling living standards, 
revolts against the rapid and seemingly unjust enrichment of a relatively small 
number of individuals who happen to be advantageously poised, often largely 
as a result of their advancement under the previous regime (the Rakowski 
government in Poland, Husak regime in Czechoslovakia, and so on). Thus, the 
policy challenge is how to design the property transfer in a way that is both fair 
and economically efficient. 
A major economic Justification of private property is that the private 
owner, being the residual claimant, will ensure that resources are allocated 
efficiently, that employees are motivated and performing, and that the enter- 
prise moves into the most profitable areas of business. Of course, the problem 
with privatizing the large state-owned companies is that very few local individu- 
als have the assets to purchase a controlling number of shares in any given 
enterprise. The choice is hence to permit large-scale foreign ownership (a 
concept somewhat resisted in all countries except Hungary) or to establish 
diluted share ownership by local individuals. In the latter scenario one faces the 
standard problem of separation of ownership and control. In the most recent 
Polish plan this problem is to be partially handled by distributing to all adult 
Polish citizens a majority of the shares of 400 large enterprises (out of a total of 
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about 5,000 large- and medium-sized firms) through shares in 20 or so mutual 
funds that would hold enterprise shares, exert control over enterprise manage- 
ment and be administered by western experts. Czechoslovakia is currently 
heading toward an intermediate path that allows individual share ownership in 
most large- and medium-sized firms both directly and through mutual funds. It 
remains to be seen if these schemes result in a major gain in enterprise 
efficiency. 
As the above discussion indicates, the establishment of strong incentives for 
key employees-including corporate managers and directors-is a difficult 
problem and in the short term most enterprises remain in state hands. The 
employment contracts of managers of state-owned enterprises are frequently 
dominated by fixed salary elements and bonuses based on the fulfillment of 
specific tasks (like investment completion); they are not strongly linked to 
improvements in enterprise efficiency. As prices are being liberalized and 
foreign competition opened up, it would be desirable to link managerial 
renumeration (outside of natural monopolies) to short- and long-term prof- 
itability of the firm, perhaps through profit-sharing and compensation through 
so-called "blocked" shares of the firm that cannot be sold for a certain time. 
Similarly, commission-based contracts for salesmen in state enterprises are 
still rare and their search for new markets is correspondingly lukewarm. In 
addition, while employee stock ownership is being seriously contemplated in 
several countries as a strategic move to make privatization popular, its role as 
an incentive scheme, a factor that exposes employees to a greater risk by 
reducing their portfolio diversification, or a means to concentrate control over 
enterprises has not been seriously considered. Direct profit-sharing for employ- 
ees has received only limited attention despite evidence that it may have 
positive effects on enterprise productivity (Weitzman and Kruse, 1990). 
In this context it is important to note that, with the exception of the Soviet 
Union, the reforming socialist economies are not rich in natural resources and 
have to rely on labor and human capital as key domestic inputs in the 
transition. The design of proper incentives is hence vitally important. More- 
over, the emphasis of the communist regime on egalitarianism, employment 
security and the special political status of the working class has severely 
undermined the work ethic, inducing shirking and diminishing individual 
initiative. The creation of a strong performance-pay link is therefore likely to 
have an especially powerful effect, accentuated by the popular belief that the 
extreme income differentials vis-a-vis the neighboring western economies should 
be viewed as a temporary abberation. Hence, while the potential effect of 
incentives has so far been underestimated, imaginative public policy in this area 
could have a great payoff. As Wellisz points out in this volume, the highly 
publicized dynamism of the Polish private sector reflects the 200-300 percent 
wage differential between comparable jobs in the private and public sector. 
Finally, a major policy preoccupation in Hungary, Poland and to a lesser 
extent Yugoslavia centers on the efficiency effects of worker participation in 
management. While powerful insiders may negatively affect resource allocation 
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across firms, they may also increase productivity within firms. An analysis of the 
Yugoslav experience suggests that the negative aspects of economic perfor- 
mance were to a large extent due to social ownership of capital and a variety of 
government interventions in the economy (Prasnikar and Svejnar, 1991). The 
participatory system (codetermination) has worked well in Austria and West 
Germany and econometric estimates from western Europe indicate that partici- 
pation may indeed have a positive effect on enterprise productivity (Estrin, 
Jones and Svejnar, 1987). 
New East-West Economic Order 
The fact that the western market economies that ideologically and intellec- 
tually spearheaded the transformation toward free markets maintain import 
restrictions on many potential East European exports-food, textiles, steel, and 
so on-has come as a shock to the new democratic governments in central and 
East Europe. There are strong arguments in favor of lifting these restrictions. 
The size of these economies is small compared to their western counterparts 
and the impact on producers in the West would not be substantial. Yet, 
providing the East European economies with access to western markets is the 
best way to strengthen their market economies. There is also a strong case for 
the advanced economies to provide additional technical and financial assistance 
to support the transformation process. 
Social Problems 
The imminent increase in apartment rents and the establishment of a 
housing market will equilibrate the housing system, improve maintenance, and 
probably also bring about social dislocations and problems. Indeed, homeless- 
ness, unemployment, open poverty, and rising crime rate are new phenomena 
to most of Eastern Europe.4 Such problems have not yet reached critical 
proportions. However, if the decline in production and national income contin- 
ues and budget cuts increase in severity, the momentum and support for 
economic reform could dissipate. The communist and other parties, as well as 
the trade unions, could provide a major challenge to the new governments. 
Since the transition to markets, unlike the introduction of central planning, is 
undertaken in a democratic system, the social aspects need to be given particu- 
lar attention if the transition is to succeed. 
While government officials and external technical assistants have put con- 
siderable effort into the construction of safety nets, the unemployment benefit 
and social security schemes are generally not set up to withstand a major inflow 
of unemployed and poor. The government-sponsored retraining programs are 
reportedly reaching only limited numbers of individuals and their effectiveness 
Yugoslavia has always had a significant unemployment rate but the problem has become especially 
acute as the rate rose from below 12 percent to about 15 percent in recent years. 
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in imparting marketable skills is unknown. This is clearly an area that deserves 
special attention. 
Infrastructure and Ecology 
Communist regimes often delayed costly maintenance and construction of 
infrastructure and put off the introduction of effective environmental protec- 
tion equipment. The new governments are facing the dilemma that infra- 
structure development and ecological amelioration both have considerable 
short-term costs, although many of the benefits are in the long term. There is a 
danger that the long-term benefits will be discounted too heavily by the present 
governments as numerous immediate problems command their attention. 
However, since sound infrastructure and environment policies confer positive 
externalities on neighboring countries, western assistance is a natural means to 
address these problems. Some steps have already been taken in this direction, 
but much more is needed. 
Conclusions 
The countries of Eastern Europe have been experiencing major disrup- 
tions associated with the disintegration of the planning system, the introduction 
of market institutions and rules, and the major external shocks brought about 
by the collapse of the Soviet-bloc trade arrangements. National income has 
fallen across the board, new social problems such as unemployment and 
inequality have emerged, and old problems like the degradation of the environ- 
ment and infrastructure demand increased attention. If a major deterioration 
of economic and social well-being occurs, it may endanger the course of the 
transition. 
The need to improve efficiency and find new markets is hence acute. One 
set of policies should focus on removing the remaining obstacles and undertak- 
ing necessary interventions to stimulate the creation of well-functioning mar- 
kets in critical areas such as finance, foreign trade and manufacturing. Another 
set of policies needs to raise economic efficiency of firms, primarily by pro- 
viding strong incentives for managers and workers of state enterprises and 
carrying out well designed privatization programs. Finally, since political sus- 
tainability is indispensable, the reform has to focus on social and labor market 
issues. Short-run measures include the provision of unemployment compensa- 
tion and labor market information to facilitate labor mobility. Long-run ori- 
ented policies need to focus on inter-regional migration, training and inflow of 
capital. 
* I would like to thank Saul Estrin, Chris Klisz, Peter Murrell, Janez Prasnikar, Carl 
Shapiro, Joseph Stiglitz, and Timothy Taylor for valuable comments on the first draft of 
the paper. 
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